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Mugabe has misinformed Zanu-PF members
By Daniel Makina
May 6, 2008
THE violent crackdown on members of the opposition including their leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, which took energised form in March 2007, finally propelled the Zimbabwe crisis to a threshold that triggered a concerted effort for its resolution.
The SADC Heads of States convened in the same month a special summit to specifically address the issue. The notable result of the special summit was the appointment of South African President Thabo Mbeki to facilitate dialogue between the opposition and the ruling party with a view to resolving the crisis.
The SADC’s decision was generally welcomed by the opposition, civil society and the international community. The only party that has not so far shown visible enthusiasm is the ruling Zanu-PF party,.
The MDC opposition viewed the appointment of President Mbeki as mediator as having permanently placed the Zimbabwe crisis on the SADC agenda unlike previous fruitless bilateral South African efforts underpinned by quiet diplomacy. Furthermore, the opposition knew very well that President Mugabe also took part in the SADC decision and hence it would be difficult for him to ignore the concerns of his counterparts without facing their censure. The Zimbabwean civil society, though welcoming the move, was cautious and wary that the facilitation of dialogue appears limited to the main protagonists –Zanu-PF and the MDC. However, this fear could be mitigated if the mediator also considers submissions by civil society. The Zimbabwe Diaspora grouping in the UK nevertheless made a submission on what it saw as the way forward. Overall, civil society is skeptical that the ruling party will give the new initiative a chance, given its continuing wayward ways.
The international community largely welcomed the initiative but believed that it should be complemented by tightening of restrictions on people responsible for human rights abuses. Britain and the EU were happy to give it a chance but at the same time signalled tightening of travel restrictions by including more senior government officials considered responsible for torture, abductions and other human rights abuses. The US has so far shown skepticism over the success of the initiative given SADC’s past inaction.
The skepticism over the new SADC initiative may not be unfounded as it stems from the ambiguity of the communiqué issued by the Heads of States. Other than appointing President Mbeki to facilitate talks between the opposition and the ruling party, the communiqué endorsed Mugabe’s positions viz.; (1) that he was elected in a free and fair election in 2002 (notwithstanding the contestations and adverse pronouncements by many observer groups that resulted in targeted sanctions and suspension from the Commonwealth); (2) that sanctions should be lifted (notwithstanding that the conditions that attracted such targeted sanctions have since worsened); and (3) that Britain should honour its Lancaster obligations (notwithstanding that no democracy (albeit Western) would survive the wrath of taxpayers by spending money on a country perceived to have no rule of law).
While there were unverified reports that Mugabe was privately censured and that he promised he will soon depart from the scene after elections (though going by his age he could have meant leaving on account of nature), the communiqué remains the only written document and the historical record for future reference. Predictably, when President Mugabe addressed the central committee of his party the following day after the SADC special summit, he only communicated the contents of the communiqué to his supporters and not the censure he got privately. There lies the danger!
Mugabe’s Questionable Dedication to Talks For President Mugabe negotiating with the opposition is a humiliation he finds difficult to stomach. First, he has to gather strength to tell colleagues in his party that a negotiated settlement is now the only way to salvage the situation. So far it appears the strongman has only communicated the contents of the communiqué of SADC and hence the party has picked two crucial points, viz.- that Mugabe is a legitimately elected leader and that sanctions should be lifted - as agenda items in talks with the opposition. What many Zimbabwean observers underestimate is that Mugabe is not easily moved from many of his so-called principled positions. As an illustration let me give you just one example that wreaked havoc on the economy: his opposition to devaluation. He labelled a Finance Minister a saboteur and fired him for advocating devaluation of the currency. The subsequent Finance Minister (also subsequently fired) had more than half of his functions transferred to the central bank governor considered to be less bookish and possibly malleable, who has been careful not to use the word devaluation and has kept the exchange rate at ZW$250 to US$1 for more than one year. In his latest monetary policy statement issued on April 26, 2007 he adjusted the exchange rate to ZW$15,000 to US$1 by introducing what he called a “drought accelerator factor” and pleaded with the media not to report that he devalued the currency. The Scotsman (26 April 2007) aptly reported: ‘Dr Gono said Zimbabweans would still have to exchange their hard currency at the ZW$250:1 US dollar rate - but would then have their payouts upped by a “drought accelerator factor” of 60.
“There is no devaluation,” Dr Gono insisted. “The exchange rate policy remains as is.” This illustration shows how Mugabe has instilled fear in everyone including his own lieutenants.
The point is that for meaningful talks to proceed, President Mugabe must first sell the idea to his party, which would be an easy task given that he has already bulldozed himself to be presidential candidate in the next election. His party might probably welcome the idea of talks on condition that he does not stand as its presidential candidate on conclusion of the talks because it knows that he cannot win a free and fair election. President Mugabe is now between two hard rocks and there is a danger he might prefer to get crushed rather than to negotiate his way out. What will make the Talks Successful? The success of a negotiated settlement hinges on actively addressing a number of factors. First, more measures and pressure may have to be applied to get the ruling party to be serious about negotiations. Crucially, SADC should communicate publicly to the rank and file of the ruling party that the violent crackdown against the opposition, disregard of the rule of law and election malpractices are issues that brought about the targeted sanctions on the ruling elite, leading to the isolation of the regime. At present, what is being communicated to them is that sanctions are a product of a Western agenda against their land policy. Second, the facilitation should also embrace civil society including Diaspora groups for a lasting solution to hold. Inclusion of more players with vested interests in addition to the opposition and the ruling party has the effect of diluting stumbling blocks arising from stubbornness of a single party and hence giving the facilitator better chances of carrying the process forward.
Third, the facilitation could require a higher body such as the UN so that the process can get international credibility, which is crucial for attracting an economic rescue package. Finally, the facilitation should not be dictated by a timescale of a pending election. It should be made clear from the outset that elections should only be held when there is agreement that the conditions are such they will be genuinely free and fair as President Mbeki recently noted.
In any case, the task at hand points to the need for transitional arrangements before credible elections.
(Daniel Makina is an associate professor with the University of South Africa and can be contacted at makind@unisa.ac.za) |
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